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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Wednesday August 10, 1977

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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25X1 National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday, August 10, 1977.

25X1 [REDACTED] The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing
senior US officials.

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
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ETHIOPIA-USSR: Disillusioned

[Redacted] Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu appears to be disenchanted with the USSR and desirous of improving relations with the US. We believe, however, that the strain in Ethiopian-Soviet relations may only be temporary. Mengistu obviously expected too much from the Soviets; for one thing he hoped the Soviets could deter Somalia from pursuing territorial ambitions against Ethiopia.

[Redacted] Soviet news coverage of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict indicates that the Soviets remain concerned over the fighting in the Ogaden and are dissatisfied with the Somalis.

[Redacted] On Saturday, Tass reported attempts by the Organization of African Unity to mediate Somali-Ethiopian differences, and earlier had quoted Ethiopian Foreign Minister Feleke's appeal for an observance of the OAU's charter, which calls for strict observance of the principle of territorial integrity and sovereignty. Tass also carried Feleke's warning that OAU failure to mediate the Somali-Ethiopian dispute could lead to border wars throughout Africa.

[Redacted] On Sunday Tass reported on Ethiopia's demand for a withdrawal of Somali regulars from the Ogaden. The Tass report also characterized rumors of Soviet pressure upon Ethiopia to concede parts of the Ogaden to Somalia a fabrication created by Arab diplomats in Mogadiscio.

[Redacted] On the same day, Soviet domestic broadcasts carried a statement by the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries that again quoted foreign news services'

reports on fighting in the Ogaden and Somali involvement. The statement called for an immediate end to the fighting and a settlement based on the OAU charter.

25X1 [] The Soviets are taking care not to offend the Somalis. The Soviets continue to quote foreign news services on the involvement of Somali troops in the Ogaden, a standard procedure for reporting facts without giving them official sanction.

25X1 [] Meanwhile the USSR continues to supply Somalia as well as Ethiopia with military hardware while attempting to mediate the conflict. []

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USSR-EGYPT: Charges and Commentary

25X1 [] *The USSR, in response to public and private Egyptian charges, has denied that its aircraft tried to jam Egyptian communications and radar during the hostilities between Egypt and Libya. The Soviets have tried to be circumspect in their commentary on the border clashes, refusing to comment on Egyptian President Sadat's accusations regarding alleged Soviet involvement, but apparently Cairo is intent on pressing its case for Soviet perfidy. These charges cannot be substantiated.*

25X1 [] *Izvestia* sarcastically denied on Monday that Soviet ships were in a position to allow helicopters to "hinder" Egyptian military communications. Previously the Soviets had ignored Sadat's charges that the USSR had supported Libyan subversive and terrorist operations prior to the fighting, as well as US press accounts that three Soviet military technicians had been killed in Egyptian air raids on Libyan radar installations.

25X1 [] The Egyptian press reported earlier this week that Foreign Minister Fahmi had met with the Soviet charge in Cairo to discuss the Egyptian protest regarding Soviet interference. Two weeks earlier, according to an Egyptian embassy official in Moscow, the USSR and Egypt had exchanged protests over their respective public commentaries on the fighting.

25X1 [] The Soviets have hitherto gone out of their way to avoid antagonizing the Egyptians during the border clashes with the Libyans. During the fighting last month, for example, the Soviets even used Egypt's National Day to call for a normalization of relations.

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[REDACTED] //The Egyptians, on the other hand, seem intent on using allegations against the Soviets to encourage greater US support for Cairo and to provide the Egyptian public with a more convincing justification for Egypt's military actions against Libya. Sadat and his chief advisers have been giving almost daily speeches and interviews outlining alleged Libyan and Soviet misdeeds against Egypt and the reasons why Egyptian armed forces were used against the Libyans.//

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[REDACTED] In his most recent round of speeches delivered to Egyptian troops stationed along the Libyan-Egyptian border, Sadat warned the Soviets that Egypt will not tolerate further Soviet interference in the dispute. He has also stressed that despite the Soviet ban on arms deliveries to Egypt, the Egyptian armed forces are becoming well equipped with weapons from diversified sources.

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[REDACTED] //Sadat and his advisers seem to be relying more and more heavily on the theme of Soviet-Libyan collaboration in their attempts to gain public acceptance of their decision to engage Libya militarily and to bolster morale among troops that participated in the fighting. By stressing the Soviet angle, Sadat presumably believes he will strike a sensitive chord not only among his own people but also among moderate Arab leaders, who have been somewhat hesitant to support Sadat openly against a fellow Arab, even if it is the troublesome Qadhafi.//

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[REDACTED] //The Egyptians also seem to be using allegations of Soviet involvement with Libya to gain greater support from the US. The Egyptians have for some time felt that the US does not fully appreciate the dangers Qadhafi poses to US interests in the Middle East, and they probably believe Washington will be more readily persuaded that Egyptian actions against the Libyan regime were appropriate if Egypt can prove a strong case of Soviet-Libyan collaboration. Moreover, Sadat has been trying for some time to convince the US that Israel is not the only bulwark against the USSR in the Middle East and that Cairo can perform this role as well as if not better than Tel Aviv.//

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[REDACTED] //The intensity of Egypt's propaganda attacks on both the Soviets and the Libyans suggests that Egyptian leaders are not only trying to justify past actions but may also be preparing their case for renewed hostilities.

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TURKEY: Political Violence

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Political violence in Turkey has quickened and is forcing the new government to admit that coping with such violence will be among its principal tasks. To the extent that the unrest is leftist-inspired, the conservative Demirel cabinet should have few qualms about moving against it. Dealing with right-wing activists could be a problem for the government should they become involved. In any event, the government will have to take the attitude of the military into account as it deals with the violence.

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Turkey has had nearly three years of civil unrest, consisting mainly of left-right confrontations on university campuses. There has been an increase in leftist urban terrorism in recent days. Murders, shootings, and bombings have rocked the major cities. The murders have apparently been planned assassinations of rightwingers rather than the often random deaths associated with student violence.

25X1

The character of these incidents strongly suggests the hand of illegal, extreme left-wing groups that see opportunities to further their own ends in the confusion surrounding the recent election and change in government. If the problem could be limited to these groups, there would be little threat to the stability of the government. The extreme left, by itself, is not strong enough to mount a real threat to the status quo.

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More worrisome to the government is the possibility that such violence, combined with threatened labor activism, could lead to similar action by undisciplined youthful adherents of the legitimate left. The latter are disillusioned and frustrated over the inability of the Republican Peoples Party to form a government despite winning a near-majority in the June election.

25X1 [] The chances of this happening will increase significantly if the urban terrorism of recent days persists into fall, when the universities reopen. The renewal of left-right campus violence will likely accompany the reopening of schools, and the situation could become explosive.

25X1 [] Prime Minister Demirel has a good man to lead the anti-terrorist campaign in Interior Minister Ozal, who has already mounted at least one wide-ranging police search for terrorists and weapons in Ankara. Similar efforts before the election were quite effective, certainly more so than government attempts to deal with the intractable campus problem.

25X1 [] The extreme right has remained quiet throughout the recent outbreak. This quiescence may be in deference to Nationalist Action Party leader and Deputy Prime Minister Turkes, whose tacit leadership of the far right is undisputed but who has been talking like a moderate of late. He is seeking a modicum of respectability to match his role in the government, enhanced by substantial electoral gains.

25X1 [] If the leftists' activities continue, however, the right will eventually retaliate. In that event, Turkes can be expected to come down hard against any proposed government action that would affect his followers. This in turn would complicate Ozal's job and incite leftist charges of government complicity in the violence.

25X1 [] The government's concern about the domestic unrest is matched by its preoccupation with how the military leadership perceives the government's handling of the problem. The current military leaders, controlled by Chief of General Staff Sancar, have shown considerable tolerance for government ineffectiveness in the past few years, but Demirel is working to minimize chances that new leaders may seek a more active role. The military has intervened in the political process twice in the past 18 years.

25X1 [] The government's attention is currently focused on the selection of a new commander of the ground forces, a powerful position in its own right and traditionally a stepping stone to the even more prestigious post of general staff chief. A new man is slated to take over the army job on August 30, and

if Sancar retires as Chief of the General Staff as expected, the new man could assume the job as early as March of next year.

The leading candidates are General Adnan Ersoz, who is widely respected in military circles and much more inclined toward political involvement than Sancar, and General Ali Fethi Esener, who is less well thought of in the military but who is perceived by Demirel and his colleagues as more amenable to civilian control. Demirel may have to make the difficult choice between a hardliner who nonetheless would be unlikely to make any rash moves and a malleable but weak chief of staff who might be unable to restrain younger officers from adventurist actions.

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PAKISTAN: Political Problems

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[] *Pakistani Chief Martial Law Administrator Zia-ul-Haq is running into problems in trying to implement plans for fair and peaceful national and provincial elections on October 18.*

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[] Two of the four members of the ruling military council reportedly are urging Zia to prosecute former prime minister Bhutto and to postpone the election until after the trial.

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[] Bhutto himself is flouting Zia's ban on political rallies. On Monday, an attempt by about 10,000 of Bhutto's supporters to greet their leader at Lahore airport led to fighting with the police and violence against prominent members of the nine-party Pakistan National Alliance.

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[] The Alliance, which expects to win the national election, called for a general strike today to protest Bhutto's activities but canceled the strike after receiving assurances that action would be taken against leaders of the pro-Bhutto demonstration.

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[] Zia can probably resist pressure from his fellow council members, at least for the time being, but if the politicians continue on their present course he may have to crack down to keep violence from spreading. To avoid a turbulent election campaign he may have to limit political activity to such an extent that the validity of the elections could be called into question.

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[] There is speculation in Pakistan that Bhutto is, in fact, trying to force Zia to take such a step. This would give Bhutto an excuse to boycott the elections and--if Zia nevertheless held the elections--grounds to claim that the results were meaningless. []

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MOZAMBIQUE: Embassy Assessment

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[] *In an assessment of Mozambique's policies and prospects, the US embassy in Maputo concludes that President Machel's government is in effective control throughout most of the country. The government's two major preoccupations are a deteriorating economy and Rhodesia.*

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[] Despite a number of economic and military setbacks during the past year, Machel and the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, the official party, remain in control of the country. Machel is the dominant force within the government and the party, and he faces no opposition from other top officials. Dissident organizations, some clandestinely supported by Rhodesia, are scattered and do not command significant followings. The population is unhappy about the economy but the embassy believes it continues to support the government.

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[] Economic indicators continue to decline. The accumulated budget deficit is expected to jump from \$22 million in 1975 to \$110 million for 1977. Droughts, floods, and recurrent food shortages have compounded the country's economic problems. The government is faced with severe shortages of skilled and semiskilled manpower but heavy unemployment and underemployment at the unskilled level.

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[] In an effort to offset economic problems, the government wants to recruit Portuguese technicians to run the farms and industries abandoned since independence and maintain its economic links with South Africa. The government allows South Africa to recruit Mozambicans to work in the mines, ships South African goods from Maputo, and sells South Africa electrical power from the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric complex.

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[] The government remains strongly committed to majority rule in Rhodesia, despite heavy military pressure from Prime Minister Smith's regime. According to the embassy, Rhodesian security forces carried out over 140 raids into Mozambique between March 1976 and March 1977. The Soviet Union is providing more sophisticated military equipment and increased training, but the results in terms of improved Mozambican combat effectiveness have not yet become noticeable.

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[] Mozambique's relations with Communist and socialist countries--its "natural allies"--remain close, particularly with the Soviet Union. The Chinese were inactive for much of the past year and have not yet regained the influence they had at the time of independence over two years ago.

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[] The US has scored a few modest gains with the Machel government during the past year, largely because of US involvement in the Rhodesian and Namibian problems. Nevertheless,

Mozambique's bias remains very much anti-Western as reflected in a hostile Mozambican press and policies on global issues antithetical to the US.

25X1 [] Looking ahead, the embassy expects that over the next year or so:

--Machel and his party will retain control of the country. Machel will face no serious challenges from the party or the army.

--The economy will continue to decline. Development will lag because of a lack of manpower and shortages of government revenues.

--Mozambique's support for the Rhodesian guerrillas will continue. The embassy expects Mozambique to ask for Cuban troops if the Smith regime launches a "punitive and penetrating" attack deep into Mozambique.

--The Machel government will maintain its close ties with the Soviet Union, although relations with China probably will improve somewhat. Relations with the US and the West in general will show some slight improvement as diplomatic contacts and trade and aid increase. []

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SUDAN: Political Amnesty Decreed

25X1 [] *Sudanese President Numayri on Sunday decreed an amnesty for political prisoners and dissidents in exile. The decree is part of an effort by Numayri to win over conservative opposition groups, especially the Ansar Islamic sect and the Muslim Brotherhood.*

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25X1 [] //The amnesty sets the stage for the return of Sadiq al-Mahdi, exiled leader of Ansar dissidents. []

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25X1 [] The deputy head of Sudan's Muslim Brotherhood is also expected to return soon.//

25X1 [] //Sadiq claims the allegiance of some 6,000 Ansar dissidents in Ethiopia and 2,000 in Libya. Numayri hopes

his return will neutralize Libyan and Ethiopian efforts to use exiled Ansar dissidents to undermine his government.//

Domestically, the decree will primarily affect an unknown number of political prisoners previously sentenced by Sudanese courts. Some 1,200 political detainees held without trial had already been released preceding the amnesty.

Reconciliation with the Ansars and the Muslim Brotherhood will help broaden Numayri's narrow political base, but he will still face opposition. Husayn al-Hindi, another prominent opposition leader who receives Ethiopian and Libyan support, apparently has rejected Numayri's offer. The conservative Khatmiyya sect, a traditional rival of the Ansar, and the Sudanese Communist Party probably will continue to oppose Numayri.

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